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•  Focus on the printed textile industry in Britain – the 
cotton industry (spinning and weaving) has a 
substantive historiography on its decline and the 
structural and investment strategy issues 
  
•  Consider the Chandlerian/ Lazonick arguments 
against evidence of strategic approaches in the 
interwar printed textiles industry 
  
•  Place the evidence of the interwar printed textile 
industry within debates on family firms and networks 
  
Core argument: 
  
The most successful printed textile firms were those 
family firms that took an entrepreneurial approach in 
developing new products; not those that attempted to 
control the market using defensive common action by 
industry networks or negotiations towards large scale 
vertical combinations. 
National competitive structure of the industry  
 
•British approach in interwar printed cotton industry: 
short-run differentiated products (Turnbull, 1951); the 
home market a Schumpterian fast moving fashion industry, 
with intensive technical innovation 
 
•American: integrated high volume standard lines, mainly 
to home market, greater labour productivity, increasing 
price-cutting (Turnbull; Rose; Leunig; Broadberry & 
Marrison) 
 
•Japanese: highly vertically integrated, government 
subsidised, low wage, high volume imitative standard 
lines, cost leader strategy 
Exports of Printed Cotton Piece Goods
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Response to context: theory 
  
Chandler (1990: 285-6, 334) – ‘Entrepreneurial failure in Britain 
in the Second Industrial Revolution was due to the failure to 
make the investments in production, distribution and 
management and create the organisation essential to compete . 
. in the textile industries, attempts to reorganise and rationalise 
production processes by creating large managerial enterprises 
seemed doomed to failure as neither the needed organisations or 
organisational capacities existed.’ 
  
Lazonick (1986); Mass & Lazonick (1990) – decline of cotton 
industry was due to failure to create large vertically integrated 
corporations with high throughput technologies. 
  
Garside (1977) – inadequate response of spinning and weaving 
organisations: did not take up schemes of industrial 
reorganisation, amalgamation and standardisation as 
recommended by the cotton unions. 
  
v. 
 
Broadberry & Marrison (2002) – American comparison disproves 
the Mass & Lazonick argument – poor results of the vertically 
integrated standard line strategy. 
  
Feinstein (1992) – integrated spinning/ weaving firms were no 
more successful than specialised ones; Dintenfass (1988) and 
Supple (1989) coal industry research did not support the 
hypothesis that large-scale corporations would be advantageous. 
  
Government integration schemes: 
Board of Trade 
 
•The 1929 Inquiry by the Sub-Committee on the Cotton 
Industry for the Committee of Civil Research was established 
to investigate improved methods of marketing, vertical co-
ordination of the industry and a reduction of costs of 
production. It was established to investigate improved 
methods of marketing, vertical co-ordination of the industry 
and a reduction of costs of production. It recommended that 
other sections of the trade should be able to negotiate with 
each section of the finishing industries as a separate entity 
and that merchants and finishers should discuss ways of 
producing finishes more cheaply (PRO BT 55/ 5).  
 
•The Cotton Industry Enquiry by the Economic Advisory 
Council Committee in 1929-30 urged the industry to co-
operate under the JCCTO in vertical integration, with better 
organisation of the merchants, as part of a series of 
amalgamations into larger units by merchants, spinners and 
manufacturers. This would enable them to form a definite 
production policy and enter into arrangements with the 
finishing organisations (PRO BT 55/ 18). 
 
Bank of England  
In cotton production, the Lancashire Cotton Corporation was 
an amalgamation/ rationalisation project funded by the 
Bank of England that bought 96 mills in 1929-30 and had 
scrapped 10 million spindles by 1934; in 1929 Combined 
Egyptian Mills (15 mills specialising in the finer Egyptian 
cotton) and the Quilt Manufacturers’ Association were 
formed. 
Industry combination and rationalisation schemes 
 
•  A Closed Works Scheme was agreed between the CPA, 
BDA and BA in December 1927, that if one of the 
Associations closed a works, the other two Associations 
would pay a quarter of the costs each: the land was 
leased out under a covenant preventing it being used in 
the textile trade. 
•  A voluntary scheme in 1928 to establish a company by 
the Associations to buy up and close down or run at a 
reduced level print, dye or bleaching companies 
foundered on lack of finance 
•  The FCP established a State of Trade Committee in 
summer 1934, resulting in a scheme to introduce a closed 
industry with a quota system, entitled 'The Calico 
Printers Reorganisation Scheme', which was put forward 
to the Board of Trade on November 16th 1936. The 
scheme was not approved by the Board of Trade, on the 
grounds that it would undermine efficiency and exclude 
newcomers. Finally the Cotton Industry (Re-organisation) 
Act was passed in August 1939, but not put into effect 
due to the war. It contained minimum price schemes with 
elaborate safeguards and redundancy schemes by 
acquisition. 
•  The Dyers' Graded Price Agreement of 1938 was a 
quota production system for piece dyeing, agreed by the 
Dyers Association, the Artificial Silk Dyers Federation and 
unallocated dyers between 1934-8. 
  
Market focused integration schemes: 
•  1929 proposal to the JCCTO to form market focused 
companies that would produce and market goods for a 
particular trade (the FCP would subscribe to the articles of 
the controlling organisation) (M75/ CPA Directors' Minute Book 
No. 12, 12/11/29). 
•  Lennox Lee (Chairman of the CPA) proposal of merger of the 
three finishing  combines and the merchant block to the 1930 
Cotton Enquiry of the Economic Advisory Council Committee 
(PRO BT 55/ 18).  
•  Ellinger & Ellinger (1930) scheme of horizontal integration 
of the merchant block. 
•  Geoffrey Turnbull 1935 scheme for market focused 
merchanting organisations, developing into vertically 
integrated combinations (Turnbull, 1951). 
 
Networks 
Manchester cotton industry epistemic geographic 
cluster – external economies of scale (Broadberry & 
Marrison, 2002) 
   
Network structures: 
FCP (Federation of Calico Printers) 
 
Allied Association of Bleachers, Dyers, Printers and 
Finishers 
Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organisations 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
Federation of British Furnishing Textile Manufacturers 
DIA (Design and Industries Association) 
 
Manchester Royal Exchange 
Textile Institute and Shirley Institute 
Manchester Art Gallery 
Manchester School of Art 
 
 
Historiographical Views: 
Rose (2000) – FCP price agreements effective 
 
Bowden & Higgens (2003) – FMCA spinning network 
had limited effectiveness in price maintenance and  
short term working; the woollen industry had no 
network schemes, an entrepreneurial strategy of 
flexible, high value specialisation with a home market 
focus, and was economically successful 
 
Strategic group: 
Finishing combinations – CPA, BDA, BA 
 
Slow decision making 
Some innovation – e.g. path dependant specialised product 
areas and designs purchased from Manchester independent 
studio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The combines focused on rationalisation, industry integration 
schemes and the establishment of production facilities in tariff 
protected export markets 

Strategic group: 
Commission-processors with specialist standard product 
types closely involved in network agreements/ protocols 
  
Export focused 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The network-embedded firms predominantly remained in a 
stasis of passive commission structures rather than active 
marketing, focusing on monopolistic price agreements for 
standard products within the British industry and 
rationalisation of capacity, which left them open to price 
cutting by overseas competitors. 
Strategic group:  
Entrepreneurial firms independent or peripheral to 
networks - sales were much stronger than for competitors, 
but rising costs limited profits. 
 
Family firms theory:  
 
Chandler: owners take a more short-term approach than 
career managers -  ‘in such personally managed firms, 
growth was not a primary objective . . many owners 
preferred current income to large-scale, long-term 
reinvestment in their enterprise’ (1990: 292) 
Chandler, Kirby, Payne: personal capitalism is less advanced 
than managerial capitalism: Chandlerian teleology   
Kindleberger, Wiener: contributed to British industrial 
decline 
Roca, Casson: conservative in approach, less risk taking as 
self-financing rather than commercial credit 
  
v. 
  
Saez, M., Colli, A. (2006): smaller family firms are more 
flexible due to closer personal control/ less hierarchy; not 
synonymous with risk aversion or lack of innovation 
Colli (2006): family firms have strengths in social 
responsibility and commitment of owners but weakness in 
finance  
Church, R. (1993): family firms continue to play a dominant 
role in many economies 
Wilson, J. (1995): Chandler, Elbaum & Lazonick are simply 
believers in the American Way and by imposing a schema on 
countries with different environments they are distorting 
views of business evolutions 
  
Summary 
  
In the interwar printed textile industry in Britain: 
•Entrepreneurial family firms peripheral or independent of 
industry networks demonstrated a more innovative 
approach, due to the close personal control, flexibility and 
sense of responsibility of founders, which was financially 
successful;  
 
•family firms and managerial firms embedded in industry 
networks took a defensive co-operative approach that 
aimed to control the market and reduce production, with 
little long term economic effectiveness.  
  
The Chandlerian/ Lazonick approach of creating very large 
vertically integrated managerial firms to benefit from 
economies of scale, to replace the atomistic personal 
capitalism structure in the cotton industry – also 
recommended by the British Government in 1929-30 and 
some industry insiders – is undermined. Independent, 
entrepreneurial firms developing innovative, differentiated 
product offerings were more effective.   
 
